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Background: In Australian end-of-life care, practicing euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide is illegal. Despite this,
death hastening practices are common across medical settings. Practices can be clandestine or overt but in many
instances physicians are forced to seek protection behind ambiguous medico-legal imperatives such as the Principle
of Double Effect. Moreover, the way they conceptualise and experience such practices is inconsistent. To
complement the available statistical data, the purpose of this study was to understand the reasoning behind how
and why physicians in Australia will hasten death.
Method: A qualitative investigation was focused on palliative and critical/acute settings. A thematic analysis was
conducted on semi-structured in-depth interviews with 13 specialist physicians. Attention was given to eliciting
meanings and experiences in Australian end-of-life care.
Results: Highlighting the importance of a multidimensional approach, physicians negotiated multiple influences
when death was regarded as hastened. The way they understood and experienced end-of-life care practices were
affected by politico-religious and cultural influences, medico-legal imperatives, and personal values and beliefs.
Interpersonal and intrapsychic aspects further emphasised the emotional and psychological investment physicians
have with patients and others. In most cases death occurred as a result of treating suffering, and sometimes to fulfil
the wishes of patients and others who requested death. Experience was especially subject to the efficacy with
which physicians negotiated complex but context-specific situations, and was reflective of how they considered a
good death. Although many were compelled to draw on the Principle of Double Effect, every physician reported its
inadequacy as a medico-legal guideline.
Conclusions: The Principle of Double Effect, as a simplistic and generalised guideline, was identified as a
convenient mechanism to protect physicians who inadvertently or intentionally hastened death. But its narrow
focus on the physician’s intent illuminated how easily it may be manipulated, thus impairing transparency and a
physician’s capacity for honesty. It is suggested the concept of “force majeure” be examined for its applicability in
Australian medical end-of-life law where, consistent with a multidimensional and complex world, a physician’s
motivations can also be understood in terms of the emotional and psychological pressures they face in situations
that hasten death.
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In the world of end-of-life care, Australia holds a position
of political and cultural importance ever since legalising
the world’s first medicalised euthanasia program - The
Rights of the Terminally Ill Act [1,2]. For a brief period
between 1996 and 1997 Australia’s Northern Territory
enacted legislation that would allow dying patients, upon
meeting specific criteria, to gain medical assistance and
control the timing and manner of their death [3]. Since
then, other countries have legalised euthanasia, for ex-
ample, the Netherlands and Belgium in 2002 [4] and
Luxembourg in 2008 [5] while Switzerland has provided
legalised physician-assisted suicide since 1941 which it
also extends to non-nationals [4,6]. In the USA, physician-
assisted suicide was legalised in Oregon in 1997 [7],
Washington State in 2008 [8] and Montana in 2009 [9,10].
However, as it is elsewhere, in Australia such death
hastening practices remain illegal despite overwhelming
public support [11-13], and consistently strong support
from physicians and nurses [14,15]. Indeed, new pro-
euthanasia/assisted suicide bills are continually presented
before various Australian State legislatures. To date, all
have been defeated by varying margins through con-
science votes, although voting is often still along party
lines [16]. Accordingly, physicians who intentionally or
inadvertently hasten death in the course of providing
end-of-life care cannot draw legislative and, thereby,
clear legal support.
However, death hastening practices, frequently at a clan-
destine level, continue unabated across Australian medical
settings and by a multidisciplinary range of practitioners
[17,18]. Such practices sometimes occur without patient
consent (up to half the cases) and sometimes with nurses
and others acting autonomously without instruction from
doctors [14,19]. Indeed, over one third (36.5%) of all
Australian deaths are caused or hastened by medical end-
of-life decisions but over two thirds are subject to them
[15,20,21].
Often the way euthanasia or assisted suicide is concep-
tualised by individual physicians is inconsistent [11,22-24]
and particular practices like increasing analgesia, treat-
ment withdrawal, and divisive interventions such as sed-
ation [25,26], all of which may hasten death, can only be
considered from the context in which they are adminis-
tered. For example, in jurisdictions like the Netherlands,
euthanasia is understood to be performed at the explicit
voluntary request of patients and through pharmaco-
logical administration. However, death hastening prac-
tices more broadly can also be performed without the
request of patients and through withdrawing life sus-
taining measures.
In a large multinational survey, Löfmark et al. [27]
highlighted the ambiguity in how physicians understand
death hastening practices. Of 1,478 Australian physicians,7% reported complying with patient requests for euthan-
asia with 28% willing to comply under certain conditions
and around 66% stating they would never comply. How-
ever, 77% reported withholding or withdrawing treatment
while 83% intensified the alleviation of pain through anal-
gesia with the probability or certainty of hastening death,
and some conceptualised these practices as euthanasia.
Accordingly, it appears that many Australian physicians in
this study may have performed euthanasia at least once,
yet on the request of patients very few complied (7%). This
discrepancy further suggests physicians are performing
these practices without patient consent.
Moreover, although those opposed to euthanasia state
that good palliative care renders it unnecessary [28], re-
search with 1,100 GPs working in end-of-life contexts in
New Zealand, reported 693 (63%) had made medical
decisions in the previous 12 months that could actually
hasten death [29]. Thirty-nine (5.6%) deaths were consist-
ent with physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia. In 17 of
these deaths doctors did not discuss their actions with the
patient. In other words, non-voluntary euthanasia oc-
curred, and in 34 (87%) of the 39 deaths palliative services
were available. The authors strongly suggested that
doctors did not consider palliative care adequate in meet-
ing patient needs and supports findings using the same
questionnaire in Australia, Belgium and the Netherlands
[21,30,31]. Ninety-four (13.6%) New Zealand physicians
reported actions that were “partly” intended to hasten
death and 50 (53%) of these did not discuss with the pa-
tient beforehand. Furthermore, 132 (19%) withdrew or
withheld treatment or increased medications to alleviate
symptoms knowing it would probably hasten death.
Physicians often confront end-of-life situations that
require specific decision making. In order to provide ap-
propriate end-of-life care that considers the dying pa-
tient, patient loved ones and collegial multidisciplinarity,
physicians need to negotiate a multitude of influential
factors. This is consistent with a multidimensional under-
standing of end-of-life care where interactive influences at
macro, meso and micro levels affect how physicians con-
ceptualise, negotiate and experience the care they provide
[32-35]. For example, macro influences like politics, reli-
gion and media; meso influences such as medico-legal
prescriptions and profession-specific ideologies (e.g. com-
fort vs. cure) are brought to bear with the micro level in-
fluences of physicians such as their own personal beliefs,
and moral/ethical positions. Physicians further engage
with multicultural influences that include diversity in indi-
vidual beliefs and attitudes of patients, loved ones and
professional colleagues to make sense of practices.
Such complex influences are important considerations
when seeking to understand the ambiguity and incon-
sistency in physicians’ end-of-life care beliefs and posi-
tions, and the practices they engage in. Furthermore,
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bedside shapes their experiences [36]. Indeed, physicians
experience burnout from personal [37-39] and also in-
terrelated organisational influences [40,41], and research
further identifies increasing numbers of physicians in
Australia leaving their profession due to unsustainable
demands being placed on them [42-45].
A complex multidimensional world renders singular
and less inclusive considerations explanatorily inadequate.
Yet medico-legally, physicians need to operate under uni-
dimensional imperatives if patient deaths are potentially
hastened. For example, the Principle of Double Effect
(PDE) has long been a protective mechanism that physi-
cians draw on in such situations and where they may
attract professional or legal retribution [46,47]. However,
the PDE provides generalised rather than situation-
specific guidelines that more often only considers the in-
tent of the physician [48]. Specifically, a physician is culp-
able if the intent is to kill but not if the intent is to
alleviate suffering even with a foreseeable outcome of
death ensuing as a direct consequence. Although the PDE
recognises proportionality in comparing good and bad
outcomes, it does not consider other extenuating influ-
ences in the physician’s motivations such as unique moral
or emotional factors that may be relevant. Indeed, com-
passion may be a particularly strong motivator. Further, if
a physician intends to end life, practices can easily be
reframed as intended to address intractable suffering. The
PDE is acknowledged as problematic [48] and remains
controversial despite efforts to improve and reinvent the
guideline [49,50].
Few jurisdictions other than the Netherlands recognise
the complexity in end-of-life decision making where pa-
tient requirements, and the physician’s interaction with
them, represent a unique dynamic. Prior to legalising eu-
thanasia and assisted suicide there in 2002, a defence of
force majeure could be drawn on by physicians to better
elucidate their intent and culpability before the law in
cases where death was hastened [51,52]. A physician’s
actions could be understood medico-legally as ascribing
to a “superior force”, where they were morally and pro-
fessionally compelled to address the suffering of patients
and as subject to the emotional and psychological pres-
sures inherent in end-of-life decision making [53,54].
Such considerations, however, are not available to physi-
cians in Australia.
The aim of this report is to document accounts of physi-
cians in Australian palliative and critical/acute settings
who need to negotiate death hastening practices in the
context of providing end-of-life care to dying patients and
patient loved ones. Accordingly, the utility of current
medico-legal imperatives is examined. Physicians’ experi-
ences and ability to assist “good deaths” are considered in
relation to multiple contextualised influences.Method
This report draws from a larger body of qualitative re-
search investigating end-of-life care, the purpose of which
was to bolster limited knowledge, particularly in the
Australian context. The ambiguity and inconsistency in
physicians’ practices and experiences, identified in an ex-
tensive literature review [55], was examined by addressing
the primary research question: How do physicians under-
stand, negotiate and experience end-of-life care decision-
making and practices in the context of Australian critical/
acute and palliative settings? A supportive research ques-
tion considered: What influences a physician to affect the
timing of death? Interview questions centred on personal
experiences and individual beliefs and positions, good and
bad deaths, and elicited information on practices where
death might be hastened (Appendix). However, a semi-
structured approach allowed a great deal of physician
direction and thus the potential for revealing other
interesting paths of inquiry. In-depth interviews were
one-on-one with the author and each between 60–
90 minutes duration.
Prior to embarking on this research, approval was ob-
tained from the University’s Human Research and Ethics
Committee (# H7589). Letters of introduction, a research
information sheet, and an informed consent document
were generated for distribution to potential participants. A
purposive recruitment strategy provided participants with
relevant experience in end-of-life care, and across different
clinical settings, with around half recruited through a
snowball strategy after referral from their colleagues. Dir-
ect contact was made by the author to16 physicians; 13
responded and agreed to participate. One was known per-
sonally to the author, some were selected through their
professional register and others because of their published
research. Sampling comprised seven palliative care spe-
cialists, three intensive care specialists, one respiratory/
thoracic specialist and two GPs. Participants were between
36 and 68 years of age, their experience in providing end-
of-life care varied from six to over 40 years, and eight phy-
sicians were male. Most practiced from hospitals and
hospices across the Sydney metropolitan area, two were
from regional areas and two were from another capital
city. Due to the sensitive and possibly illegal and profes-
sionally damaging nature of the data physicians provided,
they were guaranteed confidentiality and anonymity. Each
was provided with a pseudo-name, third party information
was de-identified, and all interviews were transcribed ex-
clusively by the author.
A thematic analysis, through an inductive/data driven
approach, was conducted according to guidelines estab-
lished by Braun and Clarke [56]. Thematic analysis was
compatible with the multidimensional approach and theor-
etical considerations of the research [34], and particularly
useful for examining data that was previously unexplored.
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ated future research questions and directions.
As part of a larger body of research, trustworthiness
was ensured by triangulation, which occurred through
discussing the coding frame with my advisory panel and
arguing its rationale according to the data, and investiga-
tive approach driving the study. Further, and assisted
through NVivo, an extensive series of notes and memos
were generated to facilitate a process of checking and re-
checking. These began by recording observational data
and thoughts upon leaving interviews, and then through-
out the analysis and written report. To ensure analytical
rigor, deviant or discrepant cases were also evaluated. Data
collection concluded when themes became saturated and
nothing new emerged. It is also important to acknowledge
that some researcher influence is unavoidable in any
research design and particularly in qualitative research
where interview dynamics have a large impact on the data
obtained. Being aware of my reflexivity and documenting
this, allowed me to attend systematically to every step of
the research process. Finally, thematic and analytical in-
tegrity was assessed through successive chapter drafts
leading to a completed thesis, and reviewed by panel
members who approved for examination. The following
analysis presents and discusses selected key themes.
Results and discussion
The first two key themes, and their subthemes, concen-
trate on how physicians understand and position them-
selves in relation to practices that hasten death. Meaning
is articulated. The remaining themes focus on their corre-
sponding experiences and recognise how the physician’s
fundamental beliefs and positions, and how they negotiate
end-of-life situations, influence experiential aspects.
Religion and sanctity of life
Religion and its concomitant sanctity of life position
[57,58] provide support to physicians who hold the belief
that death should not be deliberately hastened. Control
over life and death (and its timing) is with nature or the
divine [59]. Accordingly, such a position precludes any
acceptance of a request to die or any intentional autono-
mous action of the physician to hasten death. Although
religiosity is characteristic of hospice and palliative set-
tings, and a position held by nearly all palliative special-
ists, it also flows through broader political, legal and
professional positions, and physicians across specialties
held similar views.
To illustrate, Aaron (Respiratory/Thoracic Specialist)
who works in critical/acute settings does not support eu-
thanasia in end-of-life care: “I’d have a problem with
active euthanasia or mercy killing, but from my religious
standpoint and my religious beliefs in my medical
practice, I obviously don’t practice it”. He identifies areligious structure that influences his views (and medical
practices) but suggests euthanasia, while also describing
it as merciful, is still an ambiguous issue for him: “I could
see the rare situation where it would be appropriate but I
don’t know if I would ever become involved in that”. He ac-
knowledges that intentionally hastening death could be
appropriate in some cases which highlight the unique na-
ture of individual deaths and how each must be consid-
ered in its context.
Similarly, as a practicing Christian, Jeremy (Palliative
Specialist) identifies the influence religion is for him: “I
have involvement in the clergy and that dimension in
terms of training and expectations. That’s not what I’m
employed for…but that does obviously colour my views
and attitudes and what I bring to this field”. Accord-
ingly, he also fundamentally opposes intentionally has-
tening death. He holds the sanctity of life position which
regards euthanasia as deliberately inducing death rather
than alleviating suffering:
I do feel personally very strongly…that doctors are
doctors and not executioners, and if you want to
legalise euthanasia then you appoint executioners.
Please leave the medical profession out of it, and I
don’t see euthanasia as the ultimate relief of suffering.
I see that as inducing death deliberately.
Jeremy strongly defines the role (and identity) of doctors
as medical practitioners and not executioners. Death
should not be exclusively under their control: “I think that
life is valuable and it’s not for us to decide the time for our
birth or our death”. There is sanctity in life, and death as
with birth is not a medical decision; he suggests life and
death are subject to nature or the divine. Like Jeremy,
Kerrie (Palliative Specialist) also holds the sanctity of life
position and, consistent with medico/legal doctrine, re-
jects any support for an intentionally hastened death:
I don’t believe we should terminate life, I think it’s
going to end for all of us…I think we need to be very
respectful of life, I can’t change the outcome but I can
continue to care. I think these are very vulnerable
people, and I think if we set precedents, then there’s
lots of other vulnerable people in society where we’re
effectively saying “Ok your life is rubbish, let’s end
this”.
Kerrie mentions being “respectful of life”, it is not for
her to terminate. She accepts the inevitability of death
but how she can still care. She identifies those dying as
“very vulnerable people” and fears a precedent if death is
hastened. Kerrie clearly draws on the slippery slope ar-
gument [60]. Similarly, and although patient suffering is
a prime consideration for Gary (Palliative Specialist), it
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over the timing of death should not rest solely with him:
I can certainly understand their suffering and their
family’s suffering, but… it’s just, an area I couldn’t go
down, even if euthanasia became legalised, I’m not
sure that’s something I could do…even if I knew it was
relieving their physical suffering. I think it’s such a
minefield, you know, who you do this for…are you
trying to end someone’s life because of the suffering of
the family or…the patient…
Gary empathises with patient (and family) suffering
but illustrates how the euthanasia issue is difficult for
him. He identifies the slippery slope argument by ques-
tioning who he is actually providing euthanasia for, and
that if legalised he would still have difficulty performing
it. Around half of the physicians in the Netherlands who
deal with requests to hasten death have reported similar
reluctance to comply [61]. But Gary’s religious and fam-
ily influences also emerge here: “it might be the religious
upbringing in me that says it’s wrong to end someone’s
life and I suppose, my own family, what’s right and
wrong…my father was a policeman who….was very black
and white”. Gary acknowledges multiple social influ-
ences of family, religion and law as shaping his views on
hastening death and on what he considers right and
wrong.
The multiplicity of interactive influences seen in Gary’s
excerpts signify complex relationships in the environ-
ment between nested macro, meso and micro elements.
For example, religion and the sanctity of life position are
embodied at a cultural and political level, enforced at a
legal and professional level, and influences Gary’s family
and his upbringing. He internalises those influences
which subsequently shape how he regards end-of-life
care. The influential power of religion and the sanctity
of life position for controlling the timing of death, and
subsequently influencing personal and professional be-
liefs, were similarly seen in the excerpts from Aaron,
Kerrie and Jeremy.
Patient choice and autonomy
Contrary views to such commonly accepted positions on
hastening death are, however, also provided by some
physicians who consider patient choice and autonomy
most important in directing their position on controlling
the timing of death. Indeed, Kohlberg’s highest stage of
moral reasoning described abstract universal ethical prin-
ciples valid for all humanity regardless of concrete laws
and social agreement [62]. Right action is defined by self-
chosen ethical principles of conscience [63]. In the follow-
ing excerpts, physicians further described their personal
ethics by not only positioning themselves as a patient andbeing guided by what they would like in that position, but
also a personal belief that control over death should be in
the hands of the individual. For example, Peter (General
Practitioner) illustrates his empathy for others: “I always
think what would I want if this was me”? He places him-
self in the patient’s position, conveying a desire to be able
to direct end-of-life care. Peter believes patients should
have a choice to elect death if that is their wish, but in
making the distinction between euthanasia and physician-
assisted suicide, he encourages patient agency: “I think in
principle I’d feel more comfortable that the person who’s
acting is clearly acting of their own volition. You’re provid-
ing them with the drugs but they are taking the drugs,
there’s something nice about that”. Peter indicates his
preference to assist rather than control patient deaths. He
considers death as “something nice” when it can be
achieved through patient choice and volition.
Correspondingly, Robert (Palliative Specialist) further
illustrates the intrapsychic of physicians, specifically the
personal influences that could motivate a physician to
intentionally hasten death: “I think if ‘patient autonomy’…
was your guiding ethical principle…and your guiding
treatment motivation was ‘compassion’…and, ‘mercy’…
then, they would be two ethical and motivating factors…
that could lead you down the road of helping those people,
which are…I think, positive ethical principles”. Robert talks
of personal ethical principles in terms of autonomy, com-
passion and mercy and these reflect his philosophy of pro-
moting patient choices and helping people. Differing
somewhat from his palliative colleagues, Robert does not
rule out hastening patient deaths. However, holding such
ethical principles might not be enough to accede to a re-
quest for hastened death:
It’s not just respect for autonomy, and compassion and
mercy, but it’s also a certain amount of courage and
willingness to take risk…and, all of those things would
need to line up…and, then of course there’s the means
to do it as well and having access to that…which isn’t
always…which could be a huge challenge.
Robert additionally identifies courage, willingness and
risk to hasten death. Certainly one needs to be willing to
do something that is contrary to the beliefs of many others
and might not always sit well with one’s own beliefs, but
particularly courage to take the risk of social and profes-
sional ostracism and legal consequences. He also talks
about access and means. It might be difficult performing a
hastened death because of the suspicion it might arouse
when patients are also monitored by others, where medi-
cation charts record patient dosages and pharmaceuticals
are also securely stored and accounted for. Multiple struc-
tures might need to line up, for example, personal aspects,
opportunity within institutional frameworks, professional
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sionally and legally such as double effect. Otherwise, as
Magnusson has identified in the Australian context, at-
tempts to hasten death may be unsuccessful [17].
Motivated by suffering
Further identifying the importance of personal beliefs,
some physicians who might reject the sanctity of life
position or religious prescriptions will consider patient
suffering as the determinant of whether death is has-
tened or not. Most will still stay within accepted profes-
sional guidelines, while others consider these of lesser
importance compared to the suffering of patients and
the need to do whatever is required. For example, when
Peter (General Practitioner) is confronted by patient suf-
fering he regards control over death as a matter of
choice and necessity, and not something under natural,
divine or legal control. “Because I don’t really respect the
ethic ‘not use deliberate means to hasten death’, I see no
conflict in these instances and see them as being entirely
compatible really…because relieving suffering sometimes
involves hastening death”. Peter’s personal views on has-
tening death are not constrained by normative beliefs
that preclude intent. Similarly, although not advocating
the intent that Peter does, Gina-Leanne (Intensive Care
Specialist) is also motivated by patient suffering and
pain. She does not consider inadvertently hastening
death problematic within the critical/acute setting she
works in and its focus on saving lives:
If they’re obviously suffering…whether that’s with,
pain…or whatever it is, and you know for certain that
they are going to die and whatever it is that they’ve got
is not amenable to anything…it’s not going to make a
lot of difference really whether they die now or in
48 hours’ time, but I guess my aim is to make them
comfortable and if in the process of making them
comfortable that hastens their death well so be it.
Time appears relative in hastening death. In the course
of a lifetime, 48 hours is insignificant for Gina-Leanne.
Particularly with intractable suffering and a prognosis of
imminent death, Gina-Leanne’s aim is to comfort even if
medication plays a role in the dying process. She is clearly
drawing upon double effect.
The active/passive distinction and double effect
Although many physicians overtly support the sanctity
of life position on hastening death, when death is inad-
vertently (or otherwise) hastened, the active/passive dis-
tinction [47,64] is drawn upon by some physicians to
conceptualise and account for their actions. Some con-
sider a hastened death due to administration of narcotics
differently to a death hastened by the withdrawal of lifesustaining treatment. Similarly, the principle of double
effect provides another way of understanding and ratio-
nalising physician actions. Legal/professional imperatives
influence the position some physicians hold on hasten-
ing death.
Many physicians state that they would not intentionally
hasten death regardless of whether it is requested or not,
but death sometimes occurs as a consequence of address-
ing patient suffering. This is something Thomas (General
Practitioner) said: “look my goal is not to kill anyone but if
I need to get on top of their suffering and they die, then
that’s ok”. Sometimes physicians draw on the active/pas-
sive distinction when death is hastened foreseeably or
otherwise, and Jenny (Palliative Specialist) illustrates this
distinction: “not giving a life prolonging treatment is differ-
ent to…uhm giving the medication, which inadvertently
might hasten death, so I think they’re different” Although
outcomes might be the same, Jenny understands a more
qualitative difference between withholding versus provid-
ing treatment that may hasten death. Furthermore, she
also uses the word “inadvertently”, which suggests double
effect. Indeed, like Thomas above, most physicians in this
study referred to end-of-life practices where their explicit
intent was to alleviate suffering even though their patient
sometimes died during that process.
However, Keith (Intensive Care Specialist) draws on
double effect while making the active/passive distinction
to negotiate a patient request to hasten death:
I say, basically, “look I can understand where you’re
coming from but it’s not legal in this country to
actively end life…but having said that, what you’re
really saying is you don’t want this treatment
escalated…and I’ll understand that and I’ll withdraw
anything that we’re doing and make sure you’re not
suffering”, and usually they’re happy with that.
Keith finds the distinction useful to somewhat accede
to a request but protect himself legally and profession-
ally. He emphasises the word “actively” when ending life,
but it is almost a subversive approach where Keith needs
to reframe the meaning of a potential intervention along
legal and professional lines. He provides patients with a
safer option that addresses suffering and hastens death.
Some level of sedation or increased analgesia is suggested
when Keith “makes sure the patient is not suffering”, but
he illustrates how death hastening interventions can be
manipulated by reframing their meaning relative to intent.
Indeed, the notion of intent is slippery and Peter (General
Practitioner) describes sedation as an effective vehicle to
disguise intent:
I mean it was slow. It has to be slow; it goes under the
name of “slow euthanasia”. I said: “well how long it
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safe”. If I come along and give you a massive morphine
injection and say “here that’ll fix your pain” I can’t
defend it. So I’ve got to be able to defend myself.
Peter provides a common understanding of sedation
as “slow euthanasia” [65], but he clarifies for a patient
how hastening her death through sedation needed to be
slow if it was to afford him legal and professional protec-
tion. He identifies the ambiguous distinction between a
legal action that may hasten death (inadvertently) and
one that is more overt but illegal.
Feeling emotional pressure: The influence of others
requesting death
Most physicians experienced emotional pressure from
patients and their loved ones requesting a hastened
death. Often they would beg or plead with the physician
to be compassionate and bring about a hastened death
to end suffering. To illustrate, Robert (Palliative Special-
ist) talks of emotional pressure applied by patients to
hasten their death: “it’s much harder legally to…ah ac-
cede to a patient’s…you know, request…but it’s more than
a request, it’s not a demand because they can’t demand
uhm…but it’s a plea really”. Robert identifies requests
more as a “plea”, where patients and others place them-
selves at the mercy of the physician but also bring sig-
nificant emotional pressure to bear. Acknowledging the
legal framework he must work within, Robert mentions
the difficulty of acceding to a request for death, but it
may also be “harder” for Robert because the decision
comes with added emotional pressure. Gary (Palliative
Specialist) discussed this also: “you know some patients
and their families are literally begging you to end it…it’s
really tough sometimes but you can understand their suf-
fering”. Gary empathises with patient and family suffer-
ing and it is “tough” for him when they “beg” for death.
Similarly, Candice (Palliative Specialist) said: “you feel
the sadness, you empathise…some are in such despair
and plead with you to be compassionate and end their
burden”. Although palliative specialists who were gener-
ally focused toward a comfort-based approach to care
experienced emotional pressure to hasten death, physi-
cians who were more curatively oriented reported fre-
quent experiences of this nature. End-of-life settings are
not the same and intensive care is not a nice place to
die. Patients receive invasive procedures and therefore
requests to die are common. Often they are unable to
speak, particularly when intubated, and provide intensive
care specialists like Keith with handwritten notes: “I’ve
got several…bits of paper with people writing ‘please let
me die’…in shaky handwriting…many people don’t want
to go on when they’re in intensive care, tubes, lines and
painful procedures, and strangers…”.Dogs die a better death: Requests as control over vicarious
suffering
Certainly, many dying patients request to die but Jeremy
(Palliative Specialist) also points out that requests to
hasten death are frequently made by family members of
the dying patient. They consider that their loved one is
needlessly suffering a protracted dying process, but suf-
fering is also implicit for those who endure vicariously at
the bedside:
It’s not that uncommon, where families say things like:
“look…if Dad was the family dog, you’d deal with it”,
you know…“it shouldn’t happen to a human being; we
treat our family pets better”. Those sorts of things
get said, or you know, “how long is this going to go
on for”?
Jeremy describes the common analogy many family
members make of treating the family dog better. Fam-
ilies appeal to the compassion in their physician to be
humane and end the suffering of their loved one. Kerrie
(Palliative Specialist) also describes the analogy Jeremy
provides, where patient loved ones say: ‘“come on Doc,
this is awful’, ‘Doc you wouldn’t leave your dog like this’,
yeah ‘I’m a country person; we don’t let our animals suf-
fer like this”’. When families’ make requests to hasten
the death of their loved one, sometimes it is to also ad-
dress their own suffering. Indeed, Maggie (Palliative Spe-
cialist) believes that most requests come from families,
rather than patients, and suggests they are often made
on that basis: “the majority of direct requests come from
families, who are just struggling sitting in the room and
watching…the physical process of dying”.
A hastened death can be a good death
Physicians are not only involved in a professional rela-
tionship with dying patients and patient families; em-
pathy and rapport also indicate that relationships carry
personal and intrapsychic components. Physicians are
affected when patients die and by how they die. Inso-
much as the literature identified physicians leaving the
profession and experiencing burnout, and disengage-
ment, it is important to cite the positive aspects of
hastening death because such experiences may counter
those more negative and assist physicians to remain
motivated and engaged, and continue providing excep-
tional end-of-life care while maintaining their own
health and well-being. Bearing witness to intolerable
suffering might often be an aversive experience, par-
ticularly when treatment interventions are limited. Yet,
physicians have measures at their disposal which can
address such situations and culminate in a positive
experience. Physicians report that sometimes a good
death is a hastened one.
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sedate to end a patient’s extraordinary suffering:
There are times when I’m really glad I can use
sedation…I remember a guy about 10 years ago with
mesothelioma…who I went to see one morning and his
eyes were literally bulging, he was gripping the bedside
table and really struggling with every muscle trying to
breath, so, I mean you can’t do anything else in this
situation, because there was nothing reversible, and
ah…he was going to stay like that. And it was through
his breathlessness he pleaded with me to do
something…so I told him what I was going to do, and
consulted the family…said ok…this is what we’re going
to do, and once we start this over the next four hours
he will get sleepy and he’s not going to wake up.
Gary highlights how he collaborated with the patient
and his family on the treatment decision and provided
them with clear information on what the outcome
would be. Clearly, Gary knew that the consequence of
the treatment was death. But he had little choice to ad-
dress the level of suffering he was confronted with. The
patient was literally begging him to do something, pla-
cing Gary under considerable psychological and emo-
tional pressure. He remembers this well even after
10 years. Yet Gary considers the outcome positively. He
“felt good” turning a difficult situation into a “good
death”: “I’m glad I got to him when I did, because nobody
should suffer like that. Within a few minutes he settled…
and a few hours later passed away peacefully. I felt
good…it ended up a good death considering his situ-
ation”. Earlier Gary declared he opposes deliberately
hastening death, but when confronted by intractable
suffering, he shows he will do whatever he needs to for
the patient, even if it shortens life. Similarly, Aaron (Re-
spiratory/Thoracic Specialist) is motivated to end suffer-
ing regardless of whether it hastens death: “look, I don’t
believe in hastening death for just any reason. But there
have been patients suffering so much that there’s little
else I could do but treat it…and sometimes they died…
but I’m happy with that…I’ve stopped the suffering”.
Aaron feels “happy” hastening the deaths of patients be-
cause they no longer suffer. Like Gary, he has limited
options to do otherwise.
Keith (Intensive Care Specialist) further illustrates how
death hastening practices may be manipulated with sed-
ation to satisfy legal and professional imperatives, and
provide a satisfying outcome that addresses extraordin-
ary suffering.
You know I feel really lucky, because I’m in a position
to stop suffering…there was a fellow drowning in his
own…lung water because his heart was failing sobadly, he was really suffering, so I put him to sleep,
put a tube down him just to stop all of the secretions
coming out, but I sedated him so much I had to take
over his breathing otherwise it would have killed him,
and I said “we’re just going to put you off to sleep now”
knowing that they were the last words he’d ever hear…
and then I sort of weaned him off the ventilator…he
was deeply unconscious and 10 seconds later I pull
the tube out and now I’m withdrawing treatment
because it’s futile, but there’s only a minute between
me giving the big dose of sedation and him actually
dying…but you see, why did I intubate and then
extubate? I did it because I didn’t want it to look like
euthanasia…but that’s pretty close to euthanasia isn’t
it?…I just couldn’t watch that suffering…nobody can
watch a man drown, I mean in his own blood and
sputum, he was in so much distress…but that’s pretty
close isn’t it?
Keith indicates his intention to address what seems
like extraordinary suffering for this patient in the best
way he could, by ending life. However, he illustrates
how highly procedural it needs to be to bring about an
outcome that also protects him legally and profession-
ally, where intent is assisted by the active/passive dis-
tinction. He regards the action almost in terms of
euthanasia when he says “that’s pretty close to euthan-
asia isn’t it”. But he goes further into an almost involun-
tary euthanasia position when he declares “knowing
they were the last words he’d ever hear” with the patient
told he was only going off to sleep. This might have
avoided further patient distress but it might also have
been Keith acquiescing to an earlier request by the pa-
tient. Keith’s motivations to address suffering are quite
clear when he talks about nobody being able to watch
that amount of suffering. This begs the question of
whose suffering he was trying to alleviate. Keith stated
when he can pro-actively address such suffering: “it’s a
very satisfying experience, whereas 20 years ago I
wouldn’t have thought that was satisfying. I wouldn’t
have even thought about it perhaps”. Keith tends to
think about these instances more than he once did, but
recounts this experience as “very satisfying”. These ex-
cerpts identify the importance of context, where specific
dynamics play out that uniquely influence in the mo-
ment. For example, Keith’s experience is subject to an
interaction with the patient, his developed attitudes,
and professional/legal considerations.
But some physicians, who are not in a position to
intervene directly, educate their patients in the termin-
ology of double effect. For example, Peter (General Prac-
titioner) deals with requests to die and supports patients
who seek his advice: “I’m completely sympathetic to it”.
As their GP he acts in a somewhat consulting role and
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death from their treating physician:
I’ve been involved with a lot of people who have been
dying difficult deaths with cancer…where as their GP
I’ve suggested, that the best way in this situation to get
what they want is to try the following strategy with
their doctors…and ah…that’s sometimes been helpful
in the sense that they’ve been able to talk their doctors
into taking them through one of these uhm…double
effect deaths…I feel good helping patients like these
who have nowhere else to go.
Confronted by many patients suffering difficult deaths,
Peter enjoys helping them by providing information and
strategies on how they might approach their treating
physician and encourage them to assist hastening their
death. Asking their physician for a “double effect death”
has been helpful to patients. The treating physician is pro-
tected legally and professionally, and the patient’s wish to
die is accommodated. Peter suggests that some physicians
might more readily consider a request to die if it is made
by a patient informed with a practical strategy. Legal con-
siderations are a necessary priority for Peter when he ad-
vises patients to seek a double effect death, and he shows
how medico/legal constraints can be negotiated, but there
are also times when he steps over that legal threshold:
Uhm…on occasions I’ve talked to them about how they
ah, and I’ve got to be a little bit careful here, because
this is illegal, uhm…but I’m aware of the fact that if
they were to take certain drugs that they’re being
prescribed, in certain ways, that they would get the
peaceful death that they want, so ah, and those
situations are always coming up, and certainly I
haven’t got the slightest moral qualm about my…
involvement, I feel quite pleased about it. I think it
was the right thing to do, but it isn’t the lawful thing
to do. And…it’s one thing suggesting that they talk to
their doctors about double effect…but it’s another thing
entirely to suggest that they take this particular drug
that they’re being prescribed by another source, in a
certain way. And that’s obviously illegal.
Peter goes beyond double effect, and provides infor-
mation to patients on how misusing the medication that
another physician has prescribed can bring about the out-
come they are seeking. Such situations are frequent and
he certainly acknowledges the illegality of giving such ad-
vice, but, in complete support for his patients, he declares
he does not have the slightest moral qualm. Peter makes
his position clear indicating, that although illegal, “it was
the right thing to do”; he identifies a personal moral and
ethical framework that guides him. He also regards hisinvolvement as “quite pleasing”. This is understandable
when he can practice consistent with his beliefs, and also
successfully negotiate medico/legal constraints.
Double effect is an ambiguous scaffold
However, hastening death is often not experienced so
positively by physicians. They are required to negotiate
limited treatment options within a constraining system
of care. Most regard double effect as inadequate and fun-
damentally flawed but sometimes it is their only protective
medico/legal option. Double effect is a generalised guide-
line, yet each situation and opportunity is unique and
sometimes physicians have restricted capacity for agency
within institutionalised structures. They cannot always
practice as they consider most appropriate. At such times
they can experience their provision of care aversively. For
example, Aaron (Respiratory/Thoracic Specialist) says: “it’s
really difficult when some patients suffer intractably and
nothing you give works. Sedation isn’t perfect but some-
times it’s all you have…you can’t euthanase even if that
seems the most appropriate thing”. Similarly, Keith (Inten-
sive Care Specialist) says: “I know some patients suffer ter-
ribly…it’s tough watching that but there isn’t always
opportunity to give them what they want and so I manage
them as best as I can”.
Like a number of his colleagues, Peter (General Practi-
tioner) described the lack of options, of patients being
trapped within institutional structures, where perform-
ing a hastened death at a patient’s request was fraught
with difficulty. However, the system is sometimes negoti-
ated to bring about a hastened death, albeit within a very
limited range of options. Although successfully accom-
plishing a hastened death requested by his patient, he de-
scribed the required process as “disgusting” and “obscene”:
I described it as pretty…obscene, I mean she woke up at
one stage there, after some 24 hours in what is it, in
almost an induced coma that we were administering
using increasing levels of narcotics and Midazolam…she
woke up at one stage when the infusion stopped, in the
middle of the night…and asked her best friend who was
a nurse who was helping us with the whole process…
because what we were trying to do was bring about her
death, ah…“Am I dead”? It was just bizarre that…“Katy
am I dead”? I remember it, because I was asleep in the
next room, and there’s this scream from Katy who comes
in and wakes me up and said she’s woken up the drip’s
stopped. They got the drip started then she lapsed back
into unconsciousness again and, it’s an obscenity, I
mean we’re not seeing good medicine here, we’re seeing
an obscene practice under the guise of medical process
and ah nothing, nothing I suppose…I think it’s a, pretty
disgusting situation, now that doesn’t mean that I think
that doctors who take this path…should be criticised, it’s
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I mean no one’s suggesting doctors should go and throw
themselves on some sacrificial pile, if they want to help
you, and they have to do it in a way that they stay safe
themselves, this really is the only option.
Peter is describing a death brought about by sedation,
a legal practice manipulated to achieve an outcome suit-
able for the patient. He highlights the problematic (and
potentially traumatic) nature of such a divisive interven-
tion with the patient waking up during the process of her
death. Again supporting his medical colleagues, Peter
levels blame for such obscene deaths at the medical sys-
tem, which constrains options for hastening death. He ac-
knowledges legal and professional concerns of physicians
who elect to take this path without legislative support.
Sometimes physicians are confronted by extraordinary
suffering, where actively administering narcotics is the
only remedial choice but dramatically shortens life. Such
situations often endure psychologically for the physician
who struggles to reconcile outcomes with their personal
or professional positions on hastening death. For example,
Gary (Palliative Specialist) said: “when you treat intract-
able suffering like that and the patient dies…sometimes
you struggle…you go over it and over it in your head and
ask yourself if there was another way”. Similarly, Jeremy
(Palliative Specialist) describes such a case where he has-
tened death, and experiences ongoing self-recrimination:
Now that’s not to say that I haven’t killed people. I
remember very clearly…a well-known figure, who was
in the terminal stages of a terminal illness…extraor-
dinarily distressed with unrelieved pain and breathing
difficulties and thrashing around on the bed, and
nothing that had been given was working. And I drew
up a syringe full of Midazolam, and I popped it into a
vein, and I just pushed it in and pushed it in and
pushed it in until his breathing settled down and he
relaxed, and he stopped thrashing around, and found
ah, an induced peace if you like. Now a quarter of an
hour later he died. I cannot tell you whether my
intention was solely to relieve his suffering, or to
address my suffering, or to address the suffering of the
staff and others who knew this man. I can’t unpack
that in all honesty…I know that in all probability the
medication I gave him did hasten his death…I still
struggle to unpack that for myself.
This was an incident that occurred over 20 years ago
but still troubles Jeremy. He questions whose suffering
he was trying to alleviate and struggles to unpack and
come to terms with the experience. Physicians like Jeremy
find themselves in a difficult position. They mustn’t hasten
death according to religious doctrines (which he andothers like Gary and Aaron strongly support) or profes-
sional and legal requirements, yet they cannot witness
extraordinary suffering and do nothing either. They have
an obligation to their patient.
Physicians, who sometimes negotiate hastened deaths,
often regard being compelled to find protection within
ambiguous legal frameworks as inadequate and inappro-
priate. Double effect is divisive within the medical com-
munity [48,66]; indeed Jenny (Palliative Specialist) said:
“the old term ‘double effect’ shouldn’t be used anymore…I
think if opioids are used appropriately it should never
happen; that’s the reason why palliative care is so ex-
tremely important in Australian end-of-life care and
worldwide end-of-life care”. She promotes the value of
her specialty and the expertise of its practitioners, deny-
ing that double effect is still required. Certainly, some
physicians like Peter and Keith above will actively manipu-
late practices to hasten a death and subsequently draw on
double effect; but others will only use it reluctantly or of
necessity. For example, when his intractably suffering
patient died shortly after being treated, Jeremy (Palliative
Specialist) acknowledged how he could be compelled to
use double effect despite finding it distasteful:
I don’t like invoking the Principle of Double Effect as
justification for what I did with that patient…at all.
But, uhm…,…I know that I could. I know if someone
attacks me in law I would have to use that argument
to say that, that I was not responsible for his death…
but I feel responsible.
Using double effect does not sit well with Jeremy. He has
no other option, however, if confronted with prosecution.
Although he might find legal and professional protection,
the situation remains difficult for him. He acknowledges
the protection he has but also identifies how double effect
does not assuage his sense of responsibility for a patient’s
death. This is something he is left to deal with.
Furthermore, Robert (Palliative Specialist) identifies how
the law only considers the doctor’s “intent” when a death
is deemed to be hastened. He suggests patients implore
their physician to be compassionate and assist a hastened
death. There is significant emotional and psychological
pressure brought to bear on the physician by the patient
and also by the system or context the physician is
immersed in. Robert suggests that there is little capacity
in the law to recognise the motivations of physicians when
a death is hastened. Nonetheless, the physician is forced
to negotiate the needs of patients within a legal and pro-
fessional framework but in a way that is also consistent
with their own position on particular practices:
Not just a petty crime, the worst of all crimes, all
hinging on this concept of intention which, I think, is
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legal framework, because…the person’s autonomy,
what they’re looking to the doctor to do, the doctor’s
motive of compassion and understanding and
professional responsibility to help people who are
suffering and struggling…all of those things are
morally relevant and they should be legally relevant…I
shouldn’t be made to feel like a criminal if I’m helping
my patient!
Robert talks about other issues beyond a simplistic
evaluation of intent that are also important moral con-
siderations in a hastened death. He mentions compas-
sion, understanding, a respect for patient autonomy and
a responsibility to address suffering. Legal imperatives
should not subordinate moral relevance. He proposes a
review of current narrow and simplistic laws:
Yeah the law hinges on just one thing: was it in the
doctor’s mind to intend bringing about this guy’s
death? And…that’s a very simplistic and crude way of
framing it, and why I think there should be a review of
that law. It’s really hard focusing on the patient when
I have to always worry about what might trip me up.
And I do worry about that.
He explains how the focus he needs to keep on his pa-
tient is distracted by “always worrying” about potential
legal ramifications for the practices he engages in. But
there is little or no recognition in double effect of the
emotional or moral pressure physicians are placed under
by patients and others to accede to a hastened death.
Limitations
Although this study provided unique insights into Aus-
tralian end-of-life care practices and the experiences of
physicians when death was regarded as hastened, some
research limitations merit consideration. Sampling was
particularly appropriate for this qualitative investigation,
albeit with a potential self-selection bias. Of note, many
physicians reported some positive experiences around has-
tening death, but all of them overwhelmingly reported
death hastening experiences as distinctly negative. This
suggests that such experiences are more widespread
among physicians elsewhere. Accordingly, a mixed method
approach utilising characteristics of the present study,
could elicit both quantitative and qualitative data from a
greater number of physicians and enhance the current
findings. Additionally, the present study accessed prac-
ticing physicians, yet many others with similar experiences
who have ceased practicing for any multitude of reasons,
some of which may include burnout, could also provide
valuable data. It is also important to acknowledge interview
dynamics, with meaning and knowledge being “located”and a partly co-constructed effort, where no two interviews
(even if repeated with the same interviewee) could ever be
the same. Consistent with a multidimensional and complex
world, there is more than one truth [32]. It is for this
reason that a more generalised research approach sug-
gested above could complement rather than diminish
the present research.
Conclusions
This report has illuminated how the Principle of Double
Effect (PDE) is a divisive and inadequate medico-legal
structure. Nonetheless, the PDE is frequently drawn on by
physicians across Australian settings in situations where
death is regarded as hastened. Physicians are compelled to
negotiate the end-of-life requirements of patients and pa-
tient loved ones from within a constraining legal frame-
work, the outcomes of which influence the experiences of
all who are involved.
Situated within its larger study, this report further ad-
dresses the paucity of qualitative research examining
end-of-life care in the Australian context. Although stat-
istical data has informed the prevalence of physician
practices that hasten death, there is now a greater under-
standing of why and how physicians engage in such
practices. Through a multileveled approach, the complex-
ity of influences behind hastened deaths and how physi-
cians make sense of and experience them could be more
inclusively elucidated. Indeed, the corresponding ambigu-
ity and inconsistency reported in the literature [55,65] is
better understood when considering context specificity,
which influences how end-of-life decisions may be negoti-
ated, and illustrates how the positions and beliefs of physi-
cians might not always be compatible with practices.
A multidimensional and complex world recognises
the importance of political and religious doctrines, and
medico-legal imperatives, and acknowledges the uniquely
personal of the physician as directive in how care is ad-
ministered and subsequently experienced. Physician expe-
riences and well-being are important considerations for
the continuation and development of exemplary end-of-
life care. Legal guidance, that considers more than only
the intent of physicians in difficult decisions that may end
life, could be one way of ensuring physician motivation,
continued engagement at the bedside and the capacity for
good deaths.
Indeed, it may be worthwhile revisiting the Netherlands
and how the concept of force majeure was applied before
euthanasia became legal. Future policy research may
examine cases where force majeure was drawn upon and
upheld, and how such a concept may be applied to the
Australian context. Corporate law in Australia recog-
nises force majeure where “acts of God” are considered
a superior force. In a similar way, physicians deciding
on practices that may hasten death are also subject to
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and moral nature.
Until death hastening practices are considered not
only under criminal law but also medical law by legalis-
ing euthanasia, force majeure may be an option to create
greater transparency and acknowledge the physician’s ac-
tions in terms of emotional, psychological and moral
pressure. Manipulation of double effect might be mini-
mised yet each case where death is hastened could sub-
mit to individual scrutiny and assessment before the law
if required. A narrow concept of “intent” has long been
acknowledged as problematic but nonetheless is the
legal imperative physicians are still required to operate
under [46-48].
As explicitly stated by some physicians in this study, and
implied by many others, a review of current medico-legal
guidelines is indicated, especially if we consider it import-
ant that physicians should be able to act out of compas-
sion to a much larger extent. Legal acknowledgment of
the multifactorial influences reflected by unique bedside
dynamics may better support physicians and the interests
of their patients, and more often culminate in good
deaths. A physician’s capacity to assist good deaths is also
contingent upon maintaining their own emotional and
psychological well-being, and practicing consistent with
their personal ethics and beliefs where patients’ needs are
not necessarily subordinated by a general legal need, is
one way of achieving this.Appendix
Interview Schedule
Research Question: How do physicians understand, nego-
tiate and experience end-of-life care decision-making and
practices in the context of Australian critical/acute and
palliative settings?
Could you please tell me a little about your role in
end-of-life (EOL) care?
– What is your background?
– What EOL settings do you have experience with
(e.g. GP, palliative, critical, oncology, gerontology)?
– How long have you been providing EOL care in
Australia?
Could I ask you, what do you see as a “good death”?
– Can you give me an example from your experience
when a patient had a “good death”?
– What happened?
– What was that like for you? (Explore deeper and
seek a potential contrary)
– What did you think about that?




What do you see as a “bad death”?
– Could you describe an example from your
experience in which a patient had a “bad death”?
– What happened?
– What was that like for you? (Explore deeper)
– What did you think about that?
– How did you feel about that?
There may be times in end of life care when an inter-
vention to alleviate suffering has the foreseeable but
unintended consequence of hastening death. (Increased
analgesia-sometimes non-titrated due to restlessness; with-
holding antibiotics for pneumonia, withdrawing nutrition/
hydration in PS etc.)
– Could you give me an example from your
experience when this occurred?
– What happened (in terms of a good or bad death)?
– What was that like for you?
– What were your thoughts about that at the time?
– How did you feel on that occasion?
– What other experiences have you had when using
such end-of-life interventions?
– How have those experiences been different?
OR
– When would you consider such interventions
appropriate?
– What has been your experience with patients
making a “specific” request for you to
alleviate their suffering through
death-hastening means?
– Could you describe a time when you received a
patient request for assisted death?
– What happened?
– What did you do?
– What was that like for you?
– What were your thoughts about that?
– How did you feel on that occasion?
Research shows that suffering is often much more
than physical, for example existential suffering, anx-
iety or fear over the progression of illness, loss of
functional integrity and dignity, and loss of autonomy
and independence, have been linked more strongly
than physical pain to patient requests for hastened
death.
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patient requests (for death) to end that kind
of suffering?
– What happened?
– What did you do?
– What was that like for you?
– What were your thoughts about that?
– How did you feel on that occasion?
Have you had some experience with dying patients who,
perhaps considering themselves a burden on others, felt it
was their “duty to die”?
– Could you describe a time when you received
a request to hasten death from a patient who
considered it their “duty to die”?
– What happened?
– What was your response?
– How did you feel receiving such a request?
– Could you describe a time when you
received a request from the patient’s family
or loved ones to hasten a suffering patient’s
death?
– What happened?
– What did you do?
– What was that like for you?
– What were your thoughts about that?
– How did you feel on that occasion?
Could you describe a situation where you considered
making or would consider a decision to shorten the life
of a dying patient who was suffering intractably?
– Could you provide an example?
– What was that like for you?
– What were your thoughts about that?
– How did you feel on that occasion?
When would you consider it appropriate (in terms of
“good” or “bad” deaths) to “intentionally” hasten a pa-
tient’s death?
– What would it take?
– Are there any differences or exceptions?
Are there times when you experience a conflict be-
tween your ethical and professional duty to relieve suf-
fering and your ethical and professional duty not to use
means which deliberately hasten death?
– Could you describe a time when you had such a
conflict?
– What happened? What did you do?
– How did you feel?Are there times where you experience a conflict be-
tween your own personal standards and beliefs your eth-
ical and professional duty to relieve suffering without
hastening death?
– Could you describe a time when you had such a
conflict?
– What happened? What did you do?
– How did you feel?
Could I just ask you a couple of final questions?
– Firstly, what’s the best part of your job?
– and not really wishing to end on a bad note, but
what’s the worst part?
(End of interview)
Is there anything we might have missed or that came
up in the interview that you would like to cover or talk
further about?Supplemental interview questions
(If not raised by the physician, used selectively and when
appropriate).
Could I just ask you about your experiences with ter-
minal or palliative sedation as an end of life practice?
– Could you give me an example where you used
sedation with a particular patient?
– What happened in terms of a good or bad death?
– How did you feel on that occasion?
Is sedation a valid or practical surrogate or alternative
to VE or PAS?
– Why or why not?
Patient care for those with a terminal prognosis ultim-
ately needs to progress from a critical or acute focus to
one more palliative, for example, the cessation of more
aggressive forms of treatment to a regime that empha-
sises comfort and palliation.
– Could you describe how you negotiate new care
goals and treatment options with patients and their
loved ones as they become necessary for patients
with irreversible disease?
– What are some of the problems you encounter in
such negotiations?
– Could you give me an example of a situation when
you needed to do this?
– What happened?
– How did you feel?Competing interests
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